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Elements in Moscow opposed to the Russian democratic movement and to economic 
stabilization policies are attempting to discredit both--in part by attributing views to the 
new US administration that would serve to further these ends. Antidemocratic forces are 
interested in pinning responsibility for the population's economic hardships on the 
supposed failure of the free market policies advocated by Russia's democrats. 
Undermining the latter, now represented by the Democratic Choice bloc, would translate 
into enhanced power for the opposition--including both the conservative Civic Union and 
the extremist "Red-Brown" bloc. As the opposition forces succeed in braking reforms, 
President Yel'tsin's ability and willingness to stay his course may falter. The Russian 
government's recent changes in personnel and policy--which culminated in the 
dismissal of Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, but had wider implications--must be viewed 
anew in the light of significant information that sheds light on the opposition's tactics.
In Pravda on November 12 and in Nezavisimaya gazeta on November 19, 1992, 
respectively, major articles appeared that presented separate but compatible and 
converging interpretations of the meaning of the US presidential election results for 
Russian economic reform and political democratization.
In both cases, extrapolations were made--conveniently applied to the current Russian 
arena--from views expressed by (then) President-elect Clinton and his entourage that 
were intended actually to address American problems or to be of general relevance. 
Indeed, no specific source or quotation could be cited since, as far as can be gathered, 
the Clinton team had not meant these concepts to address Russian problems. 
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Nevertheless, both articles drew far-reaching conclusions for Russia from the opinions 
attributed to Clinton.
In Nezavisimaya gazeta, the surprisingly durable Georgii Arbatov, together with a team 
of analysts from his Institute of the US and Canada, argued that since the Clinton 
platform and victory had stemmed largely from opposition to Reaganomics, it followed 
that the Clinton presidency would oppose the program of the radical reformers in 
Moscow. As Arbatov put it, Clinton's views rest on "the rejection of precisely those 
aspects of 'Reaganomics' that the Russian authors of 'shock therapy' greeted with such 
enthusiasm."
He drew the conclusion that the "ideological closeness [of these Russian reformers] to 
people from the past [US] administration will no longer automatically ensure US support 
for this policy." He commented that, whereas the Republicans "have given preference to 
the market as a return to capitalism, the new administration will most likely pay attention 
to democracy," adding that, under Clinton, one can anticipate "a reconsideration of the 
US position regarding the IMF's tough demands on Russia." In other words, as it were, 
"Gaidarism amounts to Reaganomics" and "IMF financial requirements are typical 
capitalistic devices;" thus, the new US administration could be expected to oppose both. 
Consequently, if President Yel'tsin wished for good relations with the new administration, 
he should begin by ousting the reformers!
It should be recalled that Arbatov was one of the principal contributors to the 
Brezhnevite old guard's policy of antagonism to the US, and he remains one of the 
skeptics concerning effective liberalization of the economy.
The Pravda article, by Yuri Glukhov, utilized the same tactic to reach another--but 
related--conclusion. "It will be much harder for Russia's democrats to find a common 
language with Clinton's Democratic party ... than it was with Bush's losing 
Republicans ... Clinton will not stand on ceremony or go easy on foreign leaders who 
violate the 'democratic convention' ... 'democratic wavelengths' in the US and Russia do 
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not now coincide ... [Russia's democrats propose] that one-man presidential rule be 
introduced in Russia until the end of Yel'tsin's term of office as president. Threats to 
dissolve the parliament and the Congress of People's Deputies are in the air. [Such 
threats] make collisions with Washington inevitable."
In other words, the obstacle to democracy consists not of the anti-reform lobby in the 
Russian Congress, but rather of the reformers' efforts to constrain that lobby. The 
Congress, of course, was elected at the time when the communist party still enjoyed 
substantial power at the local level and was able to ensure the election of a large 
number of apparatchiki. If Yel'tsin uses somewhat autocratic means to obtain basically 
democratic goals, he will have to reckon with the new administration in Washington!
It seems evident, therefore, that personalities linked to the (anti-Gaidar reform) Civic 
Union and organizations more radically opposed both to reform and to democratization 
were using the US presidential elections to pressure Yel'tsin into abandoning his policies 
and his supporters alike. In this context, it must be remembered that it was precisely the 
core of Democratic Choice--his staunchest base of support--that urged Yel'tsin to adopt 
emergency measures so as to sidestep the Congress of People's Deputies, which is 
packed by members of Civic Union, as well as by extremist reactionaries.
With this fact in mind, it becomes all the more ominous that, in the period when the two 
articles appeared, Yel'tsin proceeded to: a) oust Yegor Yakovlev who, as head of 
Russian radio and television, had become identified with the new democratic spirit; b) 
demote Mikhail Poltoranin and Gennadi Burbulis, two of the more consistent supporters 
of democratization in his entourage--and it remains to be seen how much influence they 
can exercise in their new posts; and c) deliver an address to the Russian Foreign 
Ministry elite, in which he denounced much of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's pro-
Western policy and the minister himself.
Viewed against this background, Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's dismissal a few weeks 
later becomes the climax of a series of moves in the same direction, rather than a 
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startling departure. Moreover, the same setting sheds light upon Kozyrev's bizarre 
speech in Stockholm which stunned the other diplomats present. He denounced 
"persistent attempts by NATO and the Western European Union to develop plans to 
strengthen their military presence in the Baltics and other areas of the former Soviet 
Union." He assailed "interference ... in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia," adding "we 
retain the right to take the necessary unilateral measures to preserve our interests ... 
Serbia can count on the support of Great Russia in its struggle." Then he stalked out of 
the room. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister rushed to the phone to ask whether a coup 
had taken place in Moscow.
Later, apparently after intervention by US Secretary of State Eagleburger, Kozyrev 
returned and said that the speech had been a ruse to demonstrate what would happen 
if the anti-reform, anti-democratic forces in the Russian Congress prevailed--the 
elements which had denounced him as the "leader of the pro-American lobby in 
Russia."
In this context, one must now view Kozyrev's performance as a warning, 
simultaneously, to Yel'tsin (i.e., not to betray his supporters in the democratic camp) and 
to the incoming US administration (i.e., to give Moscow appropriate signals, so as to 
indicate that abandonment of reform and democratization, far from being compatible 
with the Clinton team's policies, would constitute a serious obstacle to amicable Russo-
American relations).
The question remains why Yel'tsin should have been persuaded--as apparently he was--
that deviation from the reformist and democratizing path would be advantageous as far 
as Russo-American relations were concerned, or at least would not be 
counterproductive. The timing of the events listed suggests that there was some 
linkage. Moreover, this chain of events culminated in Russia's demonstrative dissent 
from the anti-Hussein coalition's air operations in Iraq. Irrespective of this aspect, it does 
seem that Yel'tsin was not merely succumbing to pressure from the anti-reformist camp, 
as many commentaries indicated at the time of Gaidar's ouster.
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Yel'tsin's heroic image, since August of 1991, as a democrat on the barricades, cannot 
obscure entirely his early years as a typical member of the apparat and some of the 
associations established then have tended to persist. The fact is that he has promoted 
the meteoric career of an apparatchik from the military-industrial complex, Yuri Skokov, 
who has become the central figure in the "new Yel'tsin" regime.
As secretary of the Security Council, Skokov deals directly with the military and security 
services of Russia; under a July 1992 decree, he has vast administrative powers, 
particularly in the president's absence. As chair of a new commission under the Security 
Council, Skokov will coordinate all foreign affairs, thus pushing aside Kozyrev, even if 
the latter were to retain his post as foreign minister. Moreover, in this new post, Skokov 
will appoint all the other members of the commission and stipulate what precisely its 
powers will be, subject to President Yel'tsin's formal consent. Earlier, he headed a short-
lived commission that dealt with the top personnel of the Defense Ministry and the 
armed forces.
In his post on the Security Council, Skokov constitutes its direct link with the presidents 
of the various autonomous ethnic regions--and it was complaints from some of these 
leaders that provided the pretext for Yegor Yakovlev's ouster.
Other key figures on the Security Council (which is believed now to make fundamental 
policy decisions on domestic issues also) include Security Minister Viktor Barannikov 
and Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin. Events of recent months reflect both 
Yel'tsin's increasing dependency on these security agencies and the lack of effective 
supervision over their operations and personnel. With regard to civilian control (or 
absence thereof), the following quotation from Lev Ponomarev, leading parliamentarian 
and representative of the democratic movement, speaks for itself:
 ! Has anything changed as far as control of the security agencies is !
! concerned? One inevitably comes to the conclusion that there has been 
! virtually no improvement. [Ponomarev's commission investigating the aborted 
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! August 1991 coup heard complaints] from parliamentary deputies, journalists, 
! even from a government minister, that their conversations were being bugged. 
! The successor organization to the KGB still is able to undertake technical 
! measures directed against its opponents ... [A] temporary parliamentary 
! commission to monitor the reorganization of the security organs ... appears to be 
! extremely ineffective ... [N]ew staffing rosters for the central Security Ministry as 
! well as for its local administrations ... are being automatically approved ... [T]he 
! ministry is not being afforded the opportunity to transform itself from a 'warlike 
! detachment of the party' into a civilized security service ... [T]his situation gravely 
! compromises the new Russian government and the whole reform process, as 
! well as--most unfortunately--the authority of the president personally.
(Shortly thereafter, in an episode strangely reminiscent of former KGB measures 
against prominent dissidents, Ponomarev was attacked by mysterious assailants just 
outside the parliament building.) Developments have underlined that Ponomarev's 
charge was on target. Faced with an usurpation of power by the chairman of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, who commandeered an armed 
guard numbering several thousand, Yel'tsin was compelled to rely on the aid of the very 
same (former KGB) Alpha Group which had been ordered to dispose of him during the 
August 1991 coup. Alpha had been part of the notorious KGB Seventh Directorate (in 
charge of domestic surveillance, including the continued wiretapping abuses of which 
Ponomarev complained).
The Seventh Directorate now is included in one of the KGB's successor agencies, Viktor 
Barannikov's Security Ministry which, after a short interlude, has seized command again 
over several hundred thousand (former KGB) border troops and over special KGB units 
assigned to the regular armed forces. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs theoretically 
is separate from the Ministry of Security, it is headed by Barannikov's former deputy, 
Viktor Yerin, and controls armed "internal forces" of its own, including the notorious 
"black beret" OMON detachments, which were responsible for outrages against the 
civilian population in Lithuania and in Georgia.
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It seems most unlikely that Yel'tsin is fully apprised of the security sector's scope of 
activities: For example, in an effort to achieve reconciliation with South Korea, he was 
provided with the "black box" of Flight 007 (the Korean airliner that was shot down by 
Soviet planes) to be handed over to Korea's president. It turned out that one of the 
tapes inside the box (which had been in the hands of the security services) was 
missing, with consequent public embarrassment for Yel'tsin. Presumably, therefore, it is 
not only Ponomarev's commission and other parliamentary organs that lack supervision 
over the security agencies (which, recently, started again to hamper travel abroad--
despite Moscow's international commitment to freedom of movement--causing Russian 
artists to miss concert engagements).
Nor does the situation appear to be better with regard to the armed forces and their 
sector of the economy. During the January 7, 1993 Senate confirmation hearings on his 
appointment as Secretary of Defense, (then) Congressman Les Aspin expressed doubt 
that President Yel'tsin has "total control over all aspects of what is going on in the 
[Soviet] defense budget." His comment related to information concerning US 
"intelligence community estimates that by the end of this decade the Russians will 
deploy three new strategic systems" (updated versions of the silo-based SS-25, a 
mobile SS-25, and a new version of the submarine-based SSN-20--constituting major 
financial burdens on the bankrupt Russian economy). It must be recalled that continued 
heavy investment in strategic nuclear systems contradicts the usual excuse for failing to 
accelerate the conversion of the Russian armaments industry, namely that hard 
currency from the export of military hardware is urgently needed.
Mr. Aspin's surmise concerning Yel'tsin's lack of total control over the defense budget 
appears to hold true also for the actions of senior military officers. Russian forces 
stationed along the periphery, especially the 14th army in Moldova and the garrison of 
the former Baltic military district, are known to have acted on occasion not only without 
authorization from--or even consultation with--President Yel'tsin, but even without 
obtaining approval from their own military superiors in Moscow.
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Moreover, in addition to the competing military jurisdictions of the republics, especially 
Russia and Ukraine, there is a great deal of confusion between the bureaucratic 
delimitations of the CIS and Russian commands, thus freeing local commanders to act 
as they please.
Lack of supervision may have even graver implications where the activities of the former 
KGB First Directorate are concerned. That organ now constitutes the Foreign 
Intelligence Service headed by Yevgeni Primakov (who passed for decades as a 
journalist and academician, but was revealed recently to be a KGB general)--Saddam 
Hussein's would-be rescuer on the eve of Desert Storm. (It was Primakov who insisted 
then that nearly 200 Soviet military advisers stay in Baghdad and, as Russia's recent 
dissent from the western coalition's Iraqi operations revealed, at least 60 are still there 
two years later. Moreover, Primakov, despite his record, continues to be sent on 
presidential missions, such as his trip to Belgrade.) According to FBI reports, Primakov's 
service, if anything, is even more active than its predecessor and its operations in the 
US are even bolder.
Altogether, there is some reason for concern that Yel'tsin may have been misled with 
regard to the new US administration's views on radical reform and democratization in 
Russia, and that he may have been co-opted, to a degree, by bureaucratic vested 
interests (including associates from his Sverdlovsk days) and by the security 
apparatus--while, at the same time, lacking effective oversight and control over the 
security and military services and over the military sector of the economy. The leaders 
of Russia's increasingly weak democratic movement, at any rate, are watching 
developments with growing anxiety. Re-emphasis--at the highest administration level--of 
US support for Russia's genuinely democratic organizations and for wholehearted 
economic reform could play a significant role in halting or reversing such 
accommodations with holdovers from the old regime as Russia's leaders may have 
been tempted to make.
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At the same time, the West ought to rebuff attempts by Civic Union and other 
questionable elements to persuade the outside world that Yel'tsin is doomed and that 
there are more viable leaders in Moscow. With all of his shortcomings, the Russian 
president remains the only personality capable of furthering the democratization of his 
country.
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